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Executive Summary 
In 2015, civil war broke out in Yemen, swiftly followed by military intervention 
by a Saudi-led coalition intended to restore to power the deposed but legitimate 
government. Yemen was already the poorest country in the Middle East before 
the start of  the fighting, with high levels of  food insecurity, infant mortality and 
child malnutrition, and during the past two years, macroeconomic conditions 
have severely deteriorated. The majority of  Yemenis live in rural areas, yet poli-
cy-oriented research and media reporting on the current conflict tend to focus on 
the situation in major cities. 
On 29 March 2017, the LSE Middle East Centre convened a workshop to explore 
the scale of  need of  Yemen’s population, and to look at the extent to which rural 
and urban livelihoods were directly affected by the fighting as well as changing 
market conditions. Eleven specialists on Yemen, including academics, activists 
and members of  the NGO community, presented short papers and contributed 
to the discussion. Colleagues from the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
and the Department for International Development were also present. 
The workshop was split into four sessions. The first sought to provide an over-
view of  macroeconomic conditions throughout the country. The second session 
explored the specific situation in Saada governorate, a predominantly Zaydi 
governorate in Yemen’s northern highlands, bordering Saudi Arabia. The third 
session focused on Taiz governorate, Yemen’s most populous governorate, located 
in the central highlands. The final session addressed micro-politics in Aden, 
Marib and Mukalla, three provincial capitals in governorates with majority Sunni 
populations. 
This report provides a summary of  the presentations, as well as the key themes 
that emerged during the discussions. Participants found that armed struggle for 
control of  Yemen’s institutions and economic resources is a key driver of  conflict, 
and that alleviation of  the humanitarian crisis requires urgent stabilisation of 
the commodity supply chain, which depends heavily on commercial imports of 
fuel and grain. Disruption to the commodity supply chain affects both rural and 
urban populations, but rural communities – due to their distance from commer-
cial ports and main markets – are more adversely affected. 
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The Urban–Rural Divide: An Overview 
Nineteen million Yemenis, more than 70 percent of  the population, live in rural 
areas. Rural livelihoods are highly dependent on agriculture and since the late 
20th century, also on remittances from male workers in Yemeni cities and Saudi 
Arabia. Rural living standards declined in the years prior to widespread anti-cor-
ruption protests in 2011, including in provincial capitals, and further deteriorated 
during Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi’s interim presidency from 2012 onwards. 
Due to a long-term shift in methods of  crop cultivation from traditional rain-
fed agriculture to irrigation-based systems as a result of  policies promoted by 
international development institutions, Yemen relies heavily on the commercial 
import of  staples, such as rice and wheat, to meet its basic commodity needs. 
Imported grains arrive at the coastal ports, from where they are trucked by road 
to remote rural towns and villages. Since March 2015, the commodity supply 
chain has been acutely disturbed: first, as a result of  shipping restrictions and 
fighting for control over the ports; secondly, as a result of  rising fuel prices, which 
affect the cost of  transport, further inflating rising food prices; and thirdly, as a 
result of  fighting and security rents extracted by armed groups who control mul-
tiple checkpoints on the main transport routes. 
Coalition airstrikes on agricultural sites have further disrupted food production, 
including food processing and storage units. Data sets produced by the Ministry 
of  Agriculture and Irrigation1 for the period March 2015–August 2016, as well as 
the Yemen Data Project,2 which covers strikes from March 2015 to March 2017, 
show that agricultural land was the target most frequently hit in every governor-
ate with the exception of  Shabwah and al Mahwit (where the road to Sana’a was 
the main target). A further study conducted by the International Labour Organi-
zation in January 2016 found that internal displacement mainly affected the rural 
population, and had caused the agricultural sector to lose almost 50 percent of 
its workers.3 
1 The Ministry of  Agriculture and Irrigation is based in Sana’a but the data came from exten-
sion officers in the respective provinces sent in on a form provided to them.
2 Yemen Data Project. Available at http://www.yemendataproject.org/
3 ‘Yemen Damage and Needs Assessment: Crisis Impact on Employment and Labour Market’, 
International Labour Organization (January 2016). Available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/
groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_501929.pdf
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In August 2016, President Hadi moved the headquarters of  the Central Bank 
of  Yemen from Sana’a to Aden. Although this move brought the Central Bank 
under formal administrative control of  the legitimate government, it also triggered 
widespread capital flight from the formal banking sector to the informal sector. 
As trust in the formal economy has collapsed, the black market has expanded 
exponentially, with profits accruing to the commanders of  rival armed groups. 
Case Studies 
Saada Governorate 
Saada city has functioned as the spiritual and political capital of  Zaydi Shi’ism 
since the ninth century. The Ottomans occupied the Saada area in the 19th cen-
tury but left Saada city untouched. Between 2004 and 2010, Yemen’s former 
president, Ali Abdullah Saleh prosecuted an erratic civil war in Saada against the 
Houthi family and their followers, who emerged as an offshoot of  an indigenous 
Zaydi revivalist movement. Successive bouts of  fighting caused significant inter-
nal displacement, property damage and disruption to agriculture. 
Despite having fought the Houthis during the last decade of  his presidency, Saleh 
formed an expedient alliance with the Houthis after leaving office and together, 
they forced President Hadi to flee first from Sana’a to Aden, and then from Aden 
to Oman and Saudi Arabia. In May 2015, the Saudi-led Coalition declared Saada 
city a military target, and pursued a strategy of  collective punishment designed 
to weaken the Houthis’ civilian support base. Operational challenges for human-
itarian agencies working in Saada governorate, including those who maintained 
a presence during Saleh’s presidency, have intensified. The bombing of  hospitals 
has disrupted healthcare provision, while restrictions on movement – due to the 
risk of  aerial bombardment, as well as the high cost and low supplies of  fuel for 
transport – have affected aid agencies and local populations alike. 
The current conflict takes place in the long-term context of  religious nationalism. 
Since the 1980s, Saudi Arabia has sought to homogenise Islamic thought on the 
Arabian peninsula and Saudi-sponsored da‘wah – or proselytising – in Yemen has 
centered on Saada and Marib, with the goal of  destabilising indigenous social 
and religious networks, and undermining Zaydism. This, in turn, has provoked 
Zaydi revivalism, and the current war further inflames religious identity politics. 
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Taiz Governorate 
Taiz is Yemen’s most populous governorate, with a notable commercial and 
industrial sector. Taiz city is the third largest metropolitan area in the country. 
Socially, Taiz straddles the traditional fault line between areas of  Zaydi Shi‘a 
observance to the north and Sunni Shafi‘i observance to the south. Since summer 
2015, Taiz has formed the frontline between Saleh–Houthi forces and Coali-
tion-backed resistance forces, and in recent months, the battle has intensified for 
control over the western coastline, including the Red Sea ports of  Mokha and 
Hodeidah, and the Bab al Mandab Strait, a global maritime choke point. 
The majority of  the population in Taiz governorate is under 18. Young Taizis 
played a significant role during the nationwide street protests that led to Saleh’s 
departure from power in 2011–2012, and supported the subsequent transition 
process. However, in the absence of  a viable political process, there is no longer a 
political context within which they can participate. Insecurity, rising poverty and 
high unemployment further restrict their ability to contribute to public life. As a 
result, Taizi youth activists have shifted their focus to grassroots relief  activities.
Youth and civil society groups in rural areas face additional challenges, such as 
high levels of  conscription into fighting forces and high levels of  displacement. 
Both of  these factors have disrupted community cohesion in rural areas, and 
for these reasons, urban community groups inside Taiz City have proven more 
resilient. At the same time, Taiz City – which is densely populated, and the site of 
heavy fighting itself  – absorbs high numbers of  displaced people from the rural 
areas, including those who come for treatment in the city’s struggling hospitals. 
Cities in Sunni-Majority Areas 
Micro-politics in the cities of  Aden, Marib and Mukalla are highly localised. 
Aden, Yemen’s second largest city and a deepwater port, is home to a ‘green zone’ 
style complex hosting Yemeni government ministers. Marib, strategically located 
as a gateway to the oil and gas fields in the western desert provinces, functions as 
a supply hub for Coalition and resistance forces entering Yemen from the Saudi 
border to the north. Mukalla, briefly controlled by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Pen-
insula in alliance with local tribal leaders, was recaptured in coordination with 
Emirati forces in 2016. 
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Aden
The supply of  basic of  services, such as water, has been severely affected, leading 
in turn to outbreaks of  cholera and acute diarrhoea. De facto decentralisation has 
enabled local authorities to deliver some services on the ground, with the result 
that local authorities are often more active and effective than the relevant line 
ministries in President Hadi’s government. The recent Central Bank relocation 
has disrupted civil service salary payments because employee payrolls have not 
yet been transferred from Sana’a to Aden. 
Marib 
A similar process of  de facto decentralisation is taking place in Marib, with tribes 
and local administrators assuming many functions of  the state. Marib is hosting 
high numbers of  internally displaced people (IDPs), which places strain on the 
small number of  hospitals and schools in this sparsely-populated governorate. 
Security challenges remain acute, including missile strikes targeting Coalition 
forces and the assassination of  military commanders. 
Mukalla
The inhabitants of  Mukalla, the provincial capital of  Hadhramaut, hold a strong 
sense of  frustration at the degree of  centralisation during Saleh’s government, as 
well as a tangible sense of  Hadhrami identity. There are rising expectations that 
Mukalla, and Hadhramaut, will be afforded more autonomy, including a greater 
share in revenues of  Hadhrami oil, in any future peace agreement. 
Cross-Cutting Themes 
Yemen is mired in a complex civil war with multiple domestic drivers, creating 
unique conflict conditions at the local level. This is complicated by competing 
regional interests, including the struggle for real and perceived power projection 
between the Arab Gulf  states and Iran. Notably, in the course of  a full day’s 
expert-level exchange of  views and information, Iran’s role was barely men-
tioned. While Iran was understood to maintain leadership-level ties with Saleh 
and the Houthis, Iran’s material impact on conflict at the local level was assumed 
to be minimal, or lay beyond the specific expertise of  the group.
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One clear cross-cutting theme that emerged during the workshop is that while a 
political solution remains elusive, Yemen is fragmenting by default. This issue of 
de facto decentralisation will have to be addressed, if  not formalised, in any final 
peace agreement – and to a certain extent, the outcome is likely to be influenced, 
if  not determined, by the preferences of  neighbouring Gulf  states, notably Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. However, their ultimate strategic objec-
tives in Yemen, and the wider region, remain opaque. 
Another cross-cutting theme was the question of  gender, especially in relation to 
sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), the role of  women in peacebuilding 
and conflict resolution, and how to support genuine scope for women’s politi-
cal participation at all levels, as well as in civil society activities. The majority 
of  Yemen’s IDPs are women and children, and one recent study on the impact 
of  the current conflict on women revealed that Yemen’s IDPs are particularly 
vulnerable to sexual exploitation, including prostitution and underage marriage. 
Reports suggest that armed groups are also using SGBV as a weapon of  war.4
Conclusion
The state of  the economy in Yemen remains a matter of  high importance, both in 
the sense that armed struggle for control over the country’s remaining institutions 
and economic resources is a key driver of  conflict in itself, but also in the sense 
that alleviation of  the current humanitarian crisis requires urgent stabilisation 
of  the macro-economy. Disruption to the commodity supply chain affects both 
rural and urban populations, but rural communities, due to their distance from 
commercial ports and main markets, are more adversely affected. Meanwhile, 
Yemen presents a challenging operating environment for humanitarian actors 
and famine is imminent. The country further faces a looming environmental 
crisis, driven by falling oil production, chronic water shortages and the inability 
of  the land to sustain a growing population.
4 Marie-Christine Heinze and Marwa Baabbad, ‘‘Women Nowadays do Anything.’ Wom-
en’s Role in Conflict, Peace and Security in Yemen’, Saferworld Report, June 2017. Available at 
http://tiny.cc/xqtzmy (accessed 28 July 2017). At the time of  the workshop, the report was yet 
to be published but some key findings were shared verbally.
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In the short-term, there is a need for better understanding of  the informal 
coordination mechanisms that exist between local authorities and individual 
powerbrokers in cities like Aden, Marib and Mukalla that fall under the nom-
inal control of  the legitimate government but effectively operate independently. 
Longer-term negotiations over fiscal decentralisation will require a meaning-
ful and lasting agreement on the contested issue of  revenue sharing. Failure to 
achieve binding consent for any such bargain – like President Hadi’s failure to 
attain agreement on his draft federal constitution in early 2015 from key armed 
groups, notably the Houthis – will likely drive yet another cycle of  conflict. 
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